CSR and the Law

         In response to the findings of the Standing Committee of Parliament on Finance which examined the Companies Bill 2009 on CSR, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs was expecting to table a Bill in the monsoon session of Parliament. The opportunity has been missed by a whisker but the wheels of Government will continue to grind slowly but surely until the Bill becomes law. The Bill mandates that every company with specific net worth,turnover and profits ( which includes PSEs, Banks and the private sector) shall be required to contribute at least 2 percent of its average net profits during the three immediately preceding financial years to be spent on CSR activities as approved and specified by the company. The Directors shall be required to make suitable disclosures in this regard.

Drivers of CSR

         When the new law comes, it will be distinctive in the world of corporate law. Until now most countries that practice CSR have encouraged it either through broad exhortations to the boards of directors to mull over the interests of non-shareholder constituencies while making corporate decisions. By and large legal or justiciable obligations do not seem to have been imposed on companies to compulsorily undertake serious CSR activities. In developed countries CSR is something that makes business sense because of the expectations of the public and an environment that rewards support to the disadvantaged. Besides large estate duties often turn some of the richest men in the world into philanthropists-witness the rise of Foundations and charities that support an ever increasing array of causes. Indeed many of them are genuine but the rationale is founded on several considerations.

         In India save for a few philanthropic exceptions, which have supported valuable projects for decades –long before CSR was even heard of, we have a long way to go. The public sector sees itself as a part of the public and assumes that it is automatically imbued with social concern. Notwithstanding shining examples of PSEs that have genuinely assisted in providing healthcare services, education and environmental protection, most view CSR through the lens of a public relations exercise. Indeed a far cry from Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of trusteeship.

         Private companies run as family concerns still hold the Hindu families’ heredity rights as sacrosanct and non-divisible; such family conglomerates usually set up hospitals and schools (named after a parent)-often run on strictly commercial lines. The public benefits no doubt but which public and at what cost? Multi-nationals and a few large business houses have been “doing their bit” for decades putting tens of thousands of kids through school. Some others have set up philanthropic foundations that make excellent contributions; but does putting a few thousand kids in school translate into even a tiny proportion of their profits? Per-haps. Perhaps not. But until nowno one could ask.

Industry and the bona fides of CSR

         When the new law is enforced,CSR symbolism represented by corporately managed hospitals and technical institutions, pictures of smiling villagers, mobile health vans and class room & fuls of well-oiled little children will no longer be adequate proof of CSR activity. Civil society organisations will demand that the living conditions of the communities affected by an industry improve and in no case worsen. Affected citizens will question the extent of work done in the name of CSR. How were the beneficiaries selected? What did they have to say about the impact of the CSR efforts? They will demand a social audit of the processes and outcomes something which until now was only reported to shareholders – but never discussed. A system of social audits would necessarily have to be put in place to oversee the fulfilment of the proposed law.

         The public sector will have their CSR work open to examination by parliamentary committees, by the media, NGOs and RTI. Representing massive sectors like electricity, mining, agriculture, manufacturing and services the “Ratna companies” which account for a third of the 240 PSUs will be expected to contribute to sustainable economic development in a quantifiable fashion. Social audits will become the arbiters of what is sufficient and insufficient contribution. Guidelines which until now were “voluntary” will now become the benchmarks for undertaking social audit. How were the projects selected? What was the domain expertise of the company and its agents to handle the projects? Were resources laid too thinly to make a difference?

         Extractive industries like oil, coal mining and gas will be exposed to social audits which will commenton compensation for excavation and extraction, deforestation and submergence, along with sufficient and sustained evidence of caring for those affected. Social audits will question whether the company engaged proactively with all stakeholders. Did it inform them of the inherent risks of their plans and mitigate hazards? Did it respect workers’ rights? Establish an effective grievance redressal system? Explicitly show respect for human rights?

         Sooner than later this inquisition will permeate to cover private sector’s CSR work. In the area of corporate governance CSR policy would need to embrace ethics and transparency codes; anti-bribery pacts. Information disclosure would become inescapable as a part of corporate responsibility. Impact assessments supplemented with independent evaluation ofselected projects would become obligatory. Ovesight mechanisms will unquestionably come. Social audits might even substitute statutory audits when seeking evidence of CSR claims.

The beginnings of Social Audits

         When the law demands that a culture of profit making suddenly turns around to become proportionately compassionate, it will pose an unprecedented challenge for organisations. Selecting worthwhile projects that are sustainable will be another challenge. A mandatory CSR regime would require organisations and institutions to start independent oversight and audit functions in a structured way. Social audits are already integral to NREGA, the flagship employment guarantee scheme. A Task Force set up by CAG recommended that social audits cover the National Rural Health Mission, the Sarvashisksha Abhiyan and the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme too. A move to examine whether the Accountants General dealing with audit of utility PSUs in power, water, and mining sectors could be involved with RTI to provide logistic support for sensitisation of civil society groups is reported to be under discussion. There was a suggestion to depend upon NGOs (with the caveat that those with a political and sectarian agenda and institutions with a doctrinaire bias should be excluded.)

Building capacities to conduct Social Audits

         If CSR becomes mandatory there will be every need to ensure that money spent in the name of CSR is subjected to independent social audits. There will be a need to set up mechanisms which are transparent and can also prevent rent-seekers and trouble-makers from jumping on this new bandwagon. To start with, institutions with domain experience of the sector could be engaged to examine the impact created by CSR activities and to highlight and advise on best practices. It is time to build capacity to undertake such audits by encouraging independent agencies with domain knowledge to visit beneficiaries and stakeholders to understand the degree of difference that current CSR efforts have made. The CMDs of right-thinking companies should try to introduce the process straightaway so that the internal systems of the organization move from a self-congratulatory, self-referential approach to one that actively seeks advice, criticism – even exposure. The aim should be introspection and improvement not fault-finding.

         The writing is on the wall. Whether it is today or tomorrow, CSR is destined to change from its soft, cuddly status to become a concrete and binding requirement. A willingness to welcome social audits and to build capacity in that direction will ensure that money gets spent wisely and the pressure to cater to constituencies, provide photo opportunities for VIPs and placate local leaders is replaced by doing something that can really make a substantial difference to people’s lives. And in the process earn genuine goodwill.

With a focus on benefits that the systems have given to the public

CONTENTS Acknowledgments, Officers, Experts and Stakeholders Consulted, Acronyms and Abbreviations Discussions & comments Executive Summary & Summary of Major Recommendations Discussions & comments Chapter 1: Historical Perspective Discussions & comments Chapter 2: Research Discussions & comments Chapter 3: Education Discussions & comments Chapter 4: Practice Discussions & comments Chapter 5: Medicinal Plants Discussions & comments Chapter 6: Drugs Discussions & comments Epilogue Discussions & comments

THE Prime Minister and hence the government has accepted responsibility for the wrongful appointment of Mr P.J. Thomas as the Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC). But that still does not answer why important functionaries did not record the impropriety of selecting him as CVC. Had they done so, the Thomas imbroglio would never have occurred. Suppression of adverse facts would have been unheard of in earlier times.

Institutional integrity requires self policing. There is an informal as well as a formal code of conduct and placing trustworthy and ethical individuals in important positions is the first adage of the informal code of conduct. Documentation is a process and that constitutes the formal code of conduct. Both seem to have been thrown to the winds in the Thomas case.

Consider basic facts about how the jobs in the Central Government are understood. (State Governments follow completely different norms). At the Centre, appointments to top constitutional and statutory posts have invariably been decided at the top, always orally. The decision would be taken at a meeting where the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister would either advice the PM or agree to what he desires to have done. No records are maintained but once the decision is taken, the Secretary in the Department of Personnel is asked to “move the file” adding a suitable panel of names, as part of the process.

At that stage, the Department of Personnel would bring every single adverse fact which would be available to the entire hierarchy of officers in charge of vigilance to the notice of the Secretary, in writing. So if this was not done, someone gave explicit orders not to bring anything on record. Thereby the formal code of conduct which rests on documentation was forsaken.

But even before the Department of Personnel got into its act, the Principal Secretary to the PM and the Cabinet Secretary who have the lineage of every officer on their fingertips would have pointed out the unsuitability of an officer being appointed to a sensitive post. If that were not done it was a neglect of responsibility. In the past, even a whiff of impropriety, just an unsavoury newspaper report unverified and never acted upon was considered sufficient reason to recommend denial of a sensitive posting. Whatever the degree of pressure exercised and whether it emanated from members of the first family, political heavyweights or past benefactors who had to be recompensed, avoiding embarrassment to the government was sacrosanct.

At least on this one score, the informal code of conduct preserved institutional integrity by advising against the selection of an officer against whom an enquiry was pending. And the advice was always accepted no matter which government happened to be in power.

Somewhere during the short-term Prime Ministerships of V.P. Singh, Chandra Shekhar, Deve Gowda and Gujral — each stint lasted around a year or less — performance benchmarks began to be watered down — a trend that continued right up to 2004. Incompetence became acceptable. A penchant for flamboyant lifestyles and hobnobbing with persons having direct business interests, once unacceptable, became commonplace. Even so, the need for vigilance clearance was never lost sight of while appointing individuals to take charge of sensitive assignments. And if there was a problem, the name was simply dropped.

Post-2004 loyalty became a new benchmark for apportioning rewards. But despite this predilection, in the case of sensitive jobs the need for having a record free from any vigilance angle was still not compromised with. In the process, some upright officers got overlooked for important assignments because complaints remained under investigation. But the opposite never happened. A vigilance case flagged the end of the road.

But a little later a new phenomenon emerged — never witnessed in the annals of the civil service at the Centre. Important ministers and coalition partners became increasingly demanding. Unfamiliar with too many people in the Central Government, they pressed to induct those whom they had come to know or those whose work they had liked at an earlier juncture. Increasingly, Indira Gandhi’s strict policy of never posting secretaries who were known to ministers together was thrown to the winds. Instead the selection of secretaries, heads of constitutional authorities and of regulators was seen as largesse to be doled out by individual ministers. Officers responsible for oversight caved in and thereby sent a clear signal to those within the system not to act difficult.

Mr Thomas was empanelled as Secretary to the Central Government, despite a pending criminal case. From being made Parliamentary Affairs Secretary, he was further rewarded by being made Secretary in the Ministry of Telecommunications — a huge promotion. The institutional integrity of following due process collapsed. With that demands for the issue of partisan orders could no longer be resisted.

This new tendency to acquiesce in the proclivities of selected ministers punctured a time-honoured practice – one that was ironically intended to save the government from embarrassment. And despite the system possessing formidable capacity to give sound advice, it was prevented from doing so. The former CVC’s advise to hold the departmental enquiry against Mr Thomas was also ignored. (As to why the CVC suffered from amnesia at a later date is hard to understand.).The existence of a criminal case against Mr Thomas, howsoever old, fallacious and motivated, needed to have been pointed out in writing but it was deliberately not done.

Written clearances are compulsory and have to be obtained from the CVC and the Department of Personnel where the entire dossier of an officer is scrutinised to worm out anything that might cause embarrassment at a future date. No officer would have taken the risk of shilly-shallying from placing integrity-related information on record; because his own neck would be on the chopping block if the matter blew up subsequently.

Given all this, what is intriguing about the Thomas case is that the baggage he carried was deliberately concealed. What are the factors that tied the hands and sealed the lips of those charged with the responsibility of pointing out these things? Was the opportunity to obtain the mandatory clearances deliberately withheld? Why did the Secretary Personnel fail to record what he clearly knew or was he prevented from pointing it out? If so, what threat or inducement was used? Either the file containing the integrity-related information was never sought from the division dealing with vigilance clearances or an adverse note which was submitted was deliberately concealed.

All this needs to be made public because only then would officers understand that it does not pay to suppress inconvenient facts. When the political executive was not prepared to listen, had the senior-most functionaries pointed the facts out in writing, no one could have or would have overruled them. All that might have happened would have been a loss of power and prestige attached to their jobs. But at least the institutional integrity which the Supreme Court referred to would have remained intact instead of being sacrificed at the altar of political expediency.

In a country with a population of over 1 billion, not even a fraction of people is aware of the gigantic story which the forthcoming census can reveal. For the average Indian, the census is just another event—an eager enumerator’s home visit in February, followed by a flash of newspaper headlines in March.

The number game: Officials sorting data from the census form

Although a mind-boggling mass of data is generated by the census, its availability is limited to what the Registrar General of India (RGI) decides to reveal. Even after the data is released at the national level, it takes years for the district data to be published. The release of district data for 2001 came only in 2007. An interesting finding popped up from the data pertaining to Delhi—nearly 40 per cent of the population lived in one room; virtually every household owned a television set but a quarter of the families still had no toilet in their homes. Published six years after the census, no one gave it another glance.

There can be no better tool for meaningful planning than the census. But the delay in the release of disaggregated data causes it to lose relevance. Besides, most officials are ill-equipped to capture and project data that can raise uncomfortable questions. There is, therefore, a pressing need to package the census results in a way that they add meaning and content to planning.

Some nationwide surveys, despite covering not even 1 per cent of what the census encompasses, carry enormous weight because their results are easy to decipher. For instance, the National Family Health Survey [NFHS-3 (2005-06)], providing state-level estimates primarily on women’s health and the District Level Health Survey [DLHS-3 (2007-08)], focusing on women’s reproductive health indicators, are used extensively not just by academics but by health planners, the media and NGOs. Comparative charts and colourful maps are used to flag the high or low rankings on all indicators, making it easy to understand.

The census data is unfortunately difficult to chew and digest and remains coddled in the presentations of research institutions, think tanks and demography seminars. It does not throw up questions, debate or excitement within civil society when it contains information down to every household.

The census exercise is something of a miracle considering the rudimentary set-up of the RGI’s office, which operates from World War II barracks on Mansingh Road in Delhi. But no taxi or scooter driver has ever heard of it.

In countries like the UK, the policy mandates that census data should be accessible and free. There is no such law in India and the RGI’s office sells CDs for 0400 only through designated offices. How much better would it be if they could be distributed across colleges, secondary schools and libraries. A film on national television should broadcast how custom-built maps, graphs and charts can be shaped.

In 2007, the National Population Stabilisation Fund called Jansankhya Sthirata Kosh (JSK) put up PDF maps of every district on the internet, displaying district health facilities superimposed on GIS maps. Overnight, it was possible to see the clustering of primary health centres and sub-centres in different talukas. Even the distance of every village from the nearest health facility could be viewed easily. Based wholly on census data, it was executed with the help of the National Informatics Centre in just four months.

As Prabhat Jha, a leading Canadian public health researcher who works with the RGI’s office, puts it, “The Reserve Bank of India represents India’s monetary policy. The census is no less—it represents India’s central bank for social policy.”

The author was the first executive director of the National Population Stabilisation Fund, Government of India.

Statistics, Knowledge and Policy 2007: Measuring and Fostering the Progress of Societies

OECD Publication

Chapter 9

Author Shailaja Chandra was the Executive Director of the National Population Stabilisation Fund from 2006 to 2009 and is presently writing a Report for the Ministry of Health& Family Welfare on the benefits that the public has received through the Indian Systems of Medicine.

Abstract

Shailaja Chandra’s PowerPoint presentation in OECD World forum, Instanbul, Turkey from 27-30 June 2007 In this article I define what constitutes indicators and information in the context of civil society and participatory democracy. The first part describes how a government-citizen partnership called Bhagidari coupled with the Delhi Right to Information Act 2001 empowered the citizenry of New Delhi, the capital of India and promoted a climate of responsible response to civic challenges. The paper describes how the power of information could alter citizen’s lives and give them a public voice. The second part of the article explores how in nearly half the 600 districts in India, the amalgamation of GIS maps and census data has enabled disparities and inequities in the provision of health services to be placed in the public domain, in a visual, easily downloadable fashion. This internet based indicator tool is aimed at enhancing the understanding of all stakeholders viz., the affected public, media, academic bodies and non-governmental organisations to enable them to use the information to bring about change.As the mapping exercise represents almost 94% of a country of 1.2 billion people, the visual data depiction is expected to widen understanding about the extent of inequity that exists between even contiguous districts and provides a tool to increase public accountability..

Section I

Participatory Democracy: How Indicators Gave Power to the People

Statistical data, surveys, projections, extrapolations, portrayal of inequities through inter and intra regional mapping, are all vitally important as indicators. But these cannot be easily understood or visualised by lay people and because of this it inhibits their participation in demanding greater attention to be paid by governments.Generally international organisations, national Governments and statistical organisations provide the status of developments and the result of analysis through the release of reports, political speeches, press releases, seminars and discussions in which improvements (or lack of them) are projected. Couched in economic jargon and statistical terms they do not create an impact on the wider general public, because in their very nature such reports do not appear to relate directly to community or individual concerns. Instead such data becomes of use only to planners and academics working in specific sectors. This has the shortcoming of presenting a misleading picture unless the historical background and context is understood. The general public is not well versed in appreciating the nuances of academic reports,much less using the information to demand better performance.

Against these presumptions, Section I of this paper expounds on three important developments which took place in New Delhi, the capital of India, which depict how indicators and information empowered the public to hold government departments and even the political executive accountable.

Delhi is mega-city with a population of more than 16 million. Since, the city is divided into 7 parliamentary seats, 70 assembly constituencies and 272 municipal wards, political conflict and contending priorities are inherent in the situation. Being the seat of the central and state governments and with three levels of political representation, with16 National newspapers published from the city and over forty TV channels devoted to its affairs, it is a daunting situation for both political and administrative management. Arriving at a consensus is extremely difficult while pursuing government policies in the absence of public participation a one-sided affair. An unforeseen backlash can occur at any time, caused by public perception about the bona-fides of the leadership which can derail even good projects and schemes.

Since the political colour of the Members of Parliament, Members of Legislative Assembly and Municipal Councilors in New Delhi is generally different, the Government of Delhi needed to identify a way of involving the public directly, to create an understanding about who was responsible for what aspect of governance and service delivery. The government also realized the importance of giving the public a route to measure the responsiveness of the government to their concerns. Educating and involving the public was therefore of paramount importance for which they had to be first equipped with facts and data, information about processes, reporting levels and where the responsibility for action finally lay. Likewise localized information on the performance of electricity and water utilities, schools, hospitals and dispensaries, municipal services, upkeep of roads, parks etc. had to be placed in the public domain to evoke interest and involvement of citizens.

Bhagidari: A Government Citizen Partnership

Bhagidari in Hindi literally means partnership. This is an example how people’s power catapulted over 3 levels of political representation and was responsible for the creation of more than 1800 Resident Welfare Associations in New Delhi in a span of 3 years from the year 2000. The movement grew in strength as the public became aware of the systems and processes through which Government organisations could be accessed and also became conversant with how the provision of services could be demanded, as due. Collaboration with the citizenry was fundamental to address the existing and future issues affecting the quality of life of people. Thus the partnership was of mutual interest.

The Bhagidari process began with the organisation of large group meetings with a wide range of stake-holders namely resident’s welfare associations, market associations, school standards committees, environment groups. Such meetings were first organised at the district and sub-district levels as citizen’s day-to-day problems are generally localized. At the Apex level, meetings were organised by rotation, district wise every 2 months for 3 days at a time, in a large hall where 36 tables were occupied by 12 persons at each table ; 6 government representatives and 6 resident’s representatives on each roundtable. During the 3 day conclave, representatives on each table were give an opportunity to exchange lists of deficiencies and to listen to the response of the government offiials about the methodology of resolving civic problems. By the third day the macro picture emerged and senior officers of the government joined the meeting and responded to the main issues. This exposed the Residents Welfare Committee representatives to the working of the government departments and also gave them information about the intra-colony status of services, the intra-district funding available, future priorities, programmes on the anvil and the basis on which decisions had been taken.

In response the citizen’s representatives could differ with the organisation, question arbitrary decisions and also highlight instances of pick-and-choose and favoritism they had come across. They could raise issues of immediate concern to the neighbourhood and expect a positive response in the presence of senior officials.

The Bhagidari movement used newspapers, documentation, reports, awards and incentives and introduced systems for sharing lessons from failures and successes as instruments for generating momentum, expanding the support base and encouraging collaboration. The movement has now covered more than 3 million people and has helped create a network of associations which represent a large spectrum of citizens needs. Although they have no elected status, the Resident Welfare Associations have gained prominence and credibility because of their numbers and ability to leverage attention.From early initiatives which were localised, the movement spread to include more important subjects like electricity and water distribution, solid waste management. It jolted the ordinary citizen out from a state of helplessness to which he had become a accustomed and created a public awakening that public services that needed to be demanded and obtained through collective action and effective interface with Government agencies. The fulcrum on which this movement rested was the provision of information which led to empowerment.

The Bhagidari initiative received the United Nations public service award for improving transparency, accountability and responsiveness in the public service categories in 2005.

Human Development Report for Delhi

When the Bhagidari movement was in full swing it was decided to collect information for a Human Development Report (HDR) for Delhi city (the first city HDR in the world). An independent survey was commissioned which extended over 14 000 households in Delhi in 2003-04. The respondents were asked to provide their assessment of twelve different services which included education, health, water supply, power supply, sanitation, roads, transport, environment, livelihood and housing. the security of women and overall perception of governance also featured in the survey. The methodology of the survey gave due weightage to residents of eleven types of colonies which exist in the city ranging from posh up market colonies to slum clusters from rural and urban villages to the old walled city of Delhi, from Government housing, to self-promoted colonies on private land. The respondents had to comment on the performance of various sectors in terms of services offered to residents and also identify the most pressing problems that needed attention. While 82% of the residents wished to continue living in the city, their main complaints related to water supply, garbage disposal, traffic, high levels of crime and public transportation deficiencies. The collection of these indicators and zone wise display of survey results gave credibility to the process and provided a direct voice to the citizens in an organised way. It also provided a basis for making demands and holding the political representatives as well as the bureaucracy accountable. The Report was prepared by academics and experts in operational research which underscored objectivity of approach and the reliability about the results projected in the HDR. The results of the surveys are available on the website http://data.undp.org.in/shdr/delhi/completereport.pdf.

The HDR survey results gave further credibility to the Bhagidari initiative and increased public participation.

The Right to Information Act in Delhi

Side by side, the Delhi Right to Information Act was introduced in 2001 which further gave people the right to ask questions about governance, systems, processes and decisions. The introduction of the Right to Information law coupled with the Bhagidari movement brought to the fore the reluctance within the bureaucracy to open its files and system of working to public scrutiny. Since the Act allowed citizens to inspect public records, documents and works and even take samples of work, NGOs in particular became quick to use the legislation in creative ways. Data on the public distribution system, the food stock position in warehouses and its distribution showed that there was large scale diversion of essential commodities. The Indian Express group of newspapers conducted a series of camps along with a local Non-government organisation based upon the information received. The Right to Information Act created an enabling environment because people were empowered to expose wrong doing and keep public servants under check and accountable. It gave people the direct authority to question what Government organisations were expected to achieve and why there was an apparent shortfall in the outcomes.

Table  Status of Applications received under

 the Delhi Right to Information Act, 2001 and Disposed off Upto September, 2007)

Number of Applications			Information
	Received	Disposed Off	Given	Not Given
Total	11 557	11 036	10 067	969

Source : Department of Administrative Reforms, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi.

How Giving Information can also Derail Decisions

The Bhagidari movement and the avenue of Right to Information worked as a bulwark for participatory democracy. The government in power was re-elected on the strength of giving the public a meaningful place in governance, but the outcomes have to be viewed in totality.

The Government had privatised electricity at a distribution end by 2002. The expectation was that this would improve efficiency. In 2005 when the public realised that electricity meters being supplied through private companies were running fast, and the electricity bills were spiraling, they rejected the electronic meters and began questioning the privatisation process itself. Using the platform of Bhagidari and by demanding information under the Right to Information Act, non-government organisations used the information made available under the Act, to motivate the media and the public to raise issues which forced the government to abandon the proposed privatisation of water distribution in the city. Information relating to power privatisation was used to draw attention to how expensive the decision to privatise water distribution could eventually become, thereby using the power of information to forestall a government decision that had already been taken. By exposing the inter and intra-city inequities in the supply of water and the government’s intention to hand over the problem to private distributors an uproar was created, and later snowballed, involving the media, academic bodies and NGOs. The result has been that the privatisation of water has been put off indefinitely because of people’s capacity to impede the process, backed by data that exposed who was to gain through the privatisation of water. This too was an outcome of the power gained by people under Bhagidari and the Right to Information Act.

Comment

For participatory democracy to be sustainable, there is no doubt the power has ultimately to be exercised through the ballot. Information can imbue a non-elected groups with temporary power and authority to question government policies, schemes and the covert intentions behind certain policies. The dilemma is that while civil society can exert a counterveiling pressure on the domination of the state and an exploitative market, once it begins to exercise authority it can also challenge democratically established institutions. If the arbitration of what is right and wrong, important or unimportant, cost effective or sustainable, is to be determined by the public at large, it could have consequences on long term sustainability. Such civil society movements though powerful, have not been tested in the history of democratic countries. Never-the-less the power of information can make authoritarian systems accountable which point is underscored through the preceding examples

Section II

Enhancing Accountability through G. I. S. Mapping and Census Data

Population growth is one of India’s biggest challenges. India is a second most populous country in the world sustaining almost 16% of the world population on 2.4% of the land surface. The population of Indian states can be compared to the population of many countries. Unlike Europe and North-America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Thailand and Korea, India has the distinction of having an enormous growth of a young population for the next few decades. In comparative terms India is facing fewer challenges of dealing with an ageing population that many countries in the world face today. It can look forward to high productivity on account of a high proportion of the population belonging to the young cohort. By 2026, the population of India will rise by 371 million and share of 15-59 age group would be 64%. However, this cannot be an asset unless social indices like health, education, drinking water, sanitation improve side-by-side.

It was therefore felt that the provision of localised indicators and information could highlight larger issues and motivate Government authorities, the media and Non-Governmental Organisations to understand the bigger picture and what lies in store. There is every need to project statistical data in simple visual ways to empower the public. One of the most effective ways is to display inter and intra regional disparities is through maps, graphs and charts in a way that can create direct interest at a local level.

Drawing Attention to Disparity – The Power of Comparative Analysis

India is divided into 28 States administered by elected governments and 7 Union Territories (administered through the Central Government). In an effort to provide information to the public, the National Population Stabilisation Fund of India (called Jansankhya Sthirata Kosh (JSK) in Hindi), prepared State Level Health Facility maps for 19 states.. As this article gets posted on the blog, all rural districts in the whole country have been covered and the PDF maps can be easily downloaded from JSK’s website.

;Figure 1 gives the picture in respect of just one state of India (Orissa) in terms of spatial distribution of Primary Health Centres.

Spatial Distribution of PHC’s in Orissa

Figure

From the state map one can move to the district map and view the picture of each district, its sub-divisions and the population of every village along with its distance from the nearest primary health centre. The maps highlight inequities in health facility coverage down to every village to enable resources to be targeted to underserved areas. The national, state district and other roads further exhibit the proximity not only to Primary Health Centre but also to surface communication in general. All this can be viewed alongwith rank of every district on JSK’s website (www.jsk.gov.in).

The maps are an amalgamation of census data and GIS mapping and they depict not only the disparities in access to health facilities in respect of every sub-division of the districts but also provide information on the distance people have to travel to reach a health facility. This information was sent on CD to the senior most administrator of each district (called Collector or District Magistrate), the Chairman of the District Development Committee, the member of the Legislative Assembly among others to familiarise them with the extent of prevailing inequity .

Figure 2 Health Facilities in District Malkangiri, Orissa

The information highlights the inter and intra district differences and disparities in coverage by health facilities. The census data has been used to show the distance of a village from a primary health centre alongwith the population of each village living 5 kms. away, 5-10 Kms and more than 10 Kms. away from the health facilities. The GIS mapping has been used to display the clustering of health facilities and the presence of large underserved areas. The map shown in Figure 9.2 indicates the clustering of facilities in Malkangiri District of Orissa State. The Distance chart at Figure 9.3 shows the distance to be traveled to reach a Primary Health Centre represents just one sub-division (taluka) out of eight sub-divisions of that particular district. There are 600 districts in the whole

country.

Table 9.1 State – Orrisa: District – Malkangiri: Range from PHC’s

State – Orrisa: District – Malkangiri: Range from PHC’s

Table Indices Covered in Study “Ranking and Mapping of Districts” for Composite Ranking and Composite Index

Source: Ranking and Mapping of Districts, IIPS 2006.

In 2006, the International Institute for Population Sciences India released a report titled “Ranking and Mapping of Districts – Based on Socio-economic and Demographic Indicators”. The Report had given a composite Ranking to every district (Table ). This information was converted into bar charts and the ranking based of the district in terms of the composite index was made available for scrutiny on the CD sent to the districts. The bar-charts shown in Figure 9.3 and 9.4 indicate the difference between the best performing and a lowest performing district within the same state. This is something people can relate to and raise questions about.

Figure 9.3 Best Performing District of the State according to the Composite Index: District of Indore (State – Madhya Pradesh)

Source: Ranking and Mapping of Districts. IIPS 2006 and DLHS-RCH State and Nutritional Report, 2006.

*IIPS: International Institute for Population Sciences, Deonar, Mumbai, is an autonomous insititution under the administrative control of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Government of India. It Offers academic courses in the area of population studies.

Figure 9.4 Lowest Performing District of the State according to the Composite Index : Distric of Sidhi (State – Madhya Pradesh)

Source: Ranking and Mapping of Districts. IIPS 2006 and DLHS-RCH State and Nutritional Report, 2006.

*IIPS: International Institute for Population Sciences, Deonar, Mumbai, is an autonomous insititution under the administrative control of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Government of India. It Offers academic courses in the area of population studies.

The National Population Stabilisation Fund has placed all this data on its website http://jsk.gov.in which can be accessed by public representatives, administrators, media and research bodies. The organisation has publicised the availability of this information through national newspapers and magazines so that a wider group of stakeholders can access it. An average of 100-150 persons a day access the website every working day.

The point to be underscored is that until now the availability of the data on health and social indices as well as the resident population was merely seen as statistical inputs. These have now been converted into visual form and made easily accessible on the website. This is expected to empower the public to question why the inter-district and intra district indices show so much variation and why availability of health services and accompanying health indices are better in certain districts as compared to others. It is expected that in planning new health facilities the underserved areas will now get prominence.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that indicators and information can be used to empower the public to hold their policy makers accountable. Were it not for access to information and indicators, the Bhagidari initiative may not have been able to gain the leverage it gained in the context of empowering citizens of New Delhi.

It is also expected that the exercise undertaken by the National Population

Stabilisation Fund of India (called Jansankhya Sthirata Kosh in Hindi) to provide inter-state and intra-state, inter-district and intra district variations which highlight underserved districts, sub-districts and villages will lead to questions about low performance. Both the political executive as well as civil servants would be answerable for allowing apparent inequity to continue. It would necessarily require infusion of funds for upgrading facilities and services since disparities would be evident down to every village. Since data as compiled by national organisations like the Survey of India and the Registrar General of India has been used, complaints that it has been selectively compiled to credit or discredit any particular segment would not hold true.

Although such data has been available for decades, the difference now is that technology has enabled it to be displayed in visual form capable of being down loaded and lending itself to analysis even by a layperson. By improving access to information, leaders can keep themselves abreast of developments and have a basis to profess how they are promoting the quality of citizens life and how progress can be measured.

The process would also help international donors and external agencies to evaluate where critical gaps exist. The data can be used to focus on under-served areas so enabling the funding to be targeted properly.

Notes

1.

The exercise includes a population of 960 million (out of a total of 1.2 billion) from the States of Bihar,Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, West Bengal, Goa, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu covering 482 districts, 4 645 sub-division and 579 779 villages in India.

Ten States have been omitted because village boundary data is presently not available with the Survey of India. The excluded states constitute 111 districts and a population of 68 million which is relatively small (6% only), given the size of the country.

Accordingly almost 94% of a large country of 1.2 billion people has been covered through JSK’s exercise,

giving a visual idea of the location of health facilities, alo

References

Annual Report of Public Grievances Commission, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi .

Bhagidari Cell, Office of the Chief Minister, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi.

Delhi Human Development Report 2006: Partnership for Progress, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006

International Institute for Population Sciences, Nutritional Status of Children and Prevalence of Anaemia among Children, Adolescent Girls and Pregnant women, International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, 2006

National Informatics Centre, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Department of Information Technology, Government of India

National Population Stabilisation Fund, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India.

Ram, F and Chander Shekhar, Ranking and Mapping of Districts: Based on Socio-economic and Demographic Indicators, International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, 2006

Registrar General of India, Census Volumes, Census of India 2001, New Delhi

Survey of India and Registrar General of India data

World Bank, Reforming Public Services in India: Drawing Lessons from Success, 2006

The Blog-Health-o-Meter™ reads Fresher than ever.

Crunchy numbers

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In 2010, there were 92 new posts, not bad for the first year! There were 110 pictures uploaded, taking up a total of 5mb. That’s about 2 pictures per week.

The busiest day of the year was May 20th with 113 views. The most popular post that day was Population Stabilisation – Issues and Concerns .

Where did they come from?

The top referring sites in 2010 were digg.com, mail.yahoo.com, slashingtongue.com, legal5ounds.com, and obama-scandal-exposed.co.cc.

Some visitors came searching, mostly for shailaja chandra, over2shailaja, shailaja chandra ias, shailaja chandra blog, and population of india 2010.

Attractions in 2010

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Population Stabilisation – Issues and Concerns May 2010
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About January 2010
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Index May 2010

How not to ban polythene bags May 2010
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Sloth, corruption dog civil services August 2010
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With many top civil servants at the Centre charged with financial wrongdoings, the Indian Administrative Service is passing through a disturbing phase. Prasar Bharti CEO B.S. Lalli and former UP Chief Secretary Neera Yadav are only two examples of the rot that has set in. There are many more across the country. Two former Chief Secretaries of Delhi and Punjab examine the crisis in the IAS

THE day Neera Yadav, the one-time Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh, was sentenced to undergo imprisonment, it was damning for the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). Not because corruption in the senior echelons of the civil service was either a new phenomenon or rare. But because, until then, there were handy excuses to deny and dismiss accusations — investigations under way, hindrances in obtaining prosecution sanction, political nexus at play; endless court processes — the very reasons that had prevented cases of malfeasance ever reaching finality, leave alone jail.

Denial of involvement in corruption continues even today when no one with even a few years into the IAS is unaware of those among his peers and seniors that are corrupt, the quid pro quos that have secured influential jobs and even the very middlemen and women that brokered the deals. Niira Radias and their ilk have operated at different levels right from the seventies manipulating their way through the chain of personal secretaries, family factotums, and relatives of people in power — only there were no tapes depicting how the deals were struck.

But most officers do not talk about these realities openly because they cannot predict which way the wind might blow as the years pass by. As happened with Neera Yadav in UP. Even after the UP cadre IAS officers ranked Neera Yadav among the top three “most corrupt IAS officers of UP”, it did not prevent her appointment as the Chief Secretary. And that was shocking because the Chief Secretary heads the entire public service of the state, acts as the Chief Minister’s chief policy adviser carrying overall responsibility for conduct of all government business. Most former British colonies still have Chief Secretaries in the states and provinces, considered next in line after the Governor or the Chief Minister and holding vastly superior powers in bureaucracy.

No Cabinet meeting can be held without the Chief Secretary who alone can minute the proceedings. The whole civil service of the state reports directly or indirectly to him. All senior postings, including statutory and constitutional appointments, are made with his recommendation and he has the final say. He is the main negotiator on critical matters of inter-state interest while acting as a dependable bridge between the state and the Centre. For performing these functions, the Chief Secretary has to possess acumen and integrity to inspire hundreds of officers that look up to him for guidance, strength and succour, when confronted with political perils.

But the Chief Secretary, unless imbued with zeal to preserve the public interest, can instead use his extraordinary authority to manipulate the system, offer patronage to vested interests, shield corrupt officers and politicise the bureaucracy. In short, he can proactively contribute to rotten governance. Over the years, the honour and dignity of being appointed Chief Secretary has been displaced. New attributes are increasingly sought and can be found quite easily — the ability to fall in line and help the Chief Minister, the political class and business interests to achieve their greedy goals — and to do it by hook or by crook.

Had the Noida Entrepreneurs’ Association not filed a writ petition alleging bungling in land allotment during Neera Yadav’s tenure as Chairman of the Noida Authority, she would have continued as the Chief Secretary and on retirement won the election and become a Minister.

For young officers desperately looking for the path to choose, it would have reinforced the belief that it pays to go the NeeraYadav way. Only in this case the Supreme Court directed that an investigation take place which ultimately ended in a jail sentence for her.

Corruption is rampant in many state governments where a plethora of projects and programmes are implemented through arbitrary exercise of power — all in the name of the poor. Most of India’s billion-strong population lives in the states and not in the metros. The disproportionate focus on the lives and times of New Delhi obliterate what is happening by way of abysmal governance in the real India. If there is still hope that India will one day miraculously reform itself, it will not come through panel discussions on national television. It will come by ousting corrupt officials in the state governments and replacing them with honest ones. But for that the responsibility for the appointment of top players must rest in safe hands — starting with the Chief Secretary of the state. The least that has to be done is to deny senior appointments to those involved in a Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) case while simultaneously widen the ambit of corruption as recommended by the Second Administrative Reforms Commission.

The Second ARC had recommended inclusion of four kinds of misconduct to be termed as corruption: Subversion of the Constitution and democratic institutions (for example, shackling the freedom of speech and conniving with police excesses; unduly favouring or harming someone (the allotment of land, housing and scarce commodities on the principle of pick and choose as in Adarsh and Noida scams; obstruction of justice (delaying prosecution, issuance of charge-sheets and initiation of disciplinary action as in Neera Yadav’s case; and squandering public money by bodies like the Commonwealth Games Organising Committee.

A new section should be introduced under the PCA to include “collusive bribery” — “if the outcome or intended outcome of a transaction leads to a loss to the state, the public or public interest”, it would be corruption involving both the public servant and the beneficiary (for example, persistent maladministration of the public distribution system).

These recommendations, far from being woolly headed, are essential and practical. But it is unlikely that they will ever get implemented. If corruption is to be checked, the only way is to equate misgovernance with criminality. There is need for time-bound implementation of the ARC’s recommendations. We need a civil society leadership that can force the government to change the definition of corruption; backed by a PIL that can leverage judicial direction to make it happen

When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced that Mr V.K. Shunglu, former Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, would specially probe the Commonwealth Games mess, it surprised many. With six organisations already mandated to conduct investigations, what was Mr Shunglu going to detect, notwithstanding a marked resemblance to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes?

However, Mr Shunglu himself clarified his role on October 23 by stating that he would look into the “decision-making processes” and identify whether it was strong enough. If indeed that is his term of reference it is welcome because such an inquiry could well pinpoint the way the government works and expose the degree to which the main players missed the larger picture, parried, deflected, delayed or prevaricated during the process of decision-making. It is time to find out if these acts of omission constituted misconduct.

For starters, Mr Shunglu will find that many of the delays were intentional, and a means to bypass procedures in the name of urgency. This verges on committing corruption and should be treated as such.

However, equally the “My table does not have a single file on it” ploy, which is used by many senior officers to avoid taking responsibility, also needs to be exposed. This style of (mis)management permeates throughout the bureaucracy and is, perhaps, the root cause of government delays.

Outsiders to the government expect that senior officers dispose of a proposal either by agreeing to it or replacing it with a better option. But that seldom happens. “Play safe” officers get rid of files by posing seemingly sensible questions like “What are the alternatives available?” The intention behind such a move is to avoid taking a decision.

Responding to the query would require tabulating all the alternatives available, putting a cost to each alternative, analysing which option is the best and then justifying the same. It is the person who does the analysis who will pay the price for overlooking something. Most officers at the receiving end are smart enough to give a telephonic instruction to a subordinate to suggest setting up a committee to confabulate on the alternatives available. The result: intentional responsibility shifting and delay.

Unfortunately, sleuths from the Central Vigilance Commission or the Comptroller and Auditor-General, far from castigating the officer who first failed to take the decision, considering his position, seniority and experience, over-generalise the problem in an attempt to involve everyone. The result is that no one ever gets into trouble, leave alone receives punishment.

It is hoped that Mr Shunglu will come down heavily on such backstroke bureaucrats who displayed lack of initiative and resourcefulness that can be legitimately expected from senior officers.

Another subject that needs to be probed is why the factors like return on investment and the long-term sustainability of each project were not taken into account at the time of planning. Take the case of the Commonwealth Games stadia. A company with a mandate for catalysing the development of infrastructure on commercially viable lines should have been involved from the start so that earnings from the future utilisation of the facilities could have been anticipated and costs offset against those earnings. Simply saying that the stadium will now be used for training upcoming athletes will never compensate for the maintenance costs which have to be borne by taxpayers forever.

This does not happen in any country. The responsibility for not considering cost-effective Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) options should be squarely put on the shoulders of financial advisers who should have insisted on the adoption of remunerative alternatives.

Equally, Mr Shunglu should examine whether the empowered committees of secretaries and ministers gave tangible directions; whether they monitored target keeping; whether they intervened effectively enough and sufficiently in advance to prevent the delays and chaos that scorched the country’s reputation.

This would bring to the fore the pitfalls of depending on the committee culture which saturates our system. Committees can be useful to glean information or to overcome procedural requirements when time is short. But empowered committees are expected to do much more.

Mr Shunglu would do well to comment on the leadership and supervision by those who headed these empowered groups of secretaries and ministers. Did these bodies foresee trouble in time? Did they extract promises and take action if promises were not kept? Or did they simply grant approval to administrative and financial fait accomplis? Or dispatch hand-holders only after alarm bells rang?

It is also expected that Mr Shunglu would look into the role of persons in high authority who approved of ambitious projects despite having been advised in writing that there simply was not enough time to complete them.

One hears of several cases where the advice given was clearly negative, including large-scale renovation and restoration projects. But despite objections, these were pushed through. Equally, it must be seen whether officers tried to protect themselves by advising in writing against taking such decisions, meanwhile enthusiastically undertaking to get the job done and in time.

Whether Mr Shunglu will use this opportunity to show how people within the government acted or failed to act, or he will be guided by a routine “audit mentality” on processes alone has to be seen.

It is, perhaps, the first and only time that the government’s decision-making processes and capacity are being examined by one man and someone of substance. It is a rare opportunity to expose how our system tolerates ambivalence and deflection which at the end of the day is nothing short of wilful negligence. The sooner those who shirked responsibility are exposed, the better.